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Abstract. There has been enormous increase in transactions and cooperative-
computing services on the internet. This is both a technical and a social phe-
nomenon. Transactions and services over the internet have global reach and users,
known or unknown to the service provider, might be interested in availing access or
participating in the cooperative transaction in a distributed manner. Thus, it is very
important for service providers to identify and establish trustworthiness of potential
collaborators, which they do by writing contracts (e.g. access control, security poli-
cies; the words contract and policy are used interchangeably) without violating the
privacy and confidentiality laws that prevail across geographical boundaries. But as
the system becomes complex and dynamic, contractual incompleteness arises since
it becomes cumbersome to mention potentially large set of outcomes of the user’s
choice of action. Trust plays a crucial role in the design of optimal contracts; not
all the relevant, valuable information on the user’s choice of action is incorporated
in the equilibrium contract. It may also be noted in that traditional transactions, the
notion of seeing is believing plays a vital role. However, in e-transactions, this is
not the case. The challenge is to see how in such a scenario trust can indeed be gen-
erated. Note that the presence of trust facilitates cooperative behaviour and allows
for exchange to occur in situations where its absence would preclude trade.
In this paper, we shall present a comparative analysis of various approaches
of trust management in practice that integrates technology with other factors. We
shall also bring out the relative deficiencies and how these issues are tackled in our
ongoing work that facilitates execution of optimal contracts.
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1. Introduction
The utility and benefits of e-commerce are well known. Internet has become an important
medium for disseminating information, doing commerce and business. The enabling tech-
nologies are helping the organizations to put their resources and work-flow systems etc. over
the internet. The expansion of network access is driving an increase in interactions among
people and between people and businesses (a set of interacting parties often called electronic
community). It is widely acknowledged that e-commerce has fallen short of its expected
potential in terms of applications. This can be attributed, among many factors, to the lack
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of trust that participants have in e-commerce transactions. In real-world human supervised
transactions, many transactions go through the notion of seeing is believing. However, such a
notion is absent in the cliche of e-transactions. The absence of trust among unfamiliar people
makes it necessary to rely on factors such as the party’s philosophy (seeing is believing!), psy-
chology and factors like transaction economics, risk, optimism etc., for making transactions.
In the context of transactions over the Internet, it is not possible to use factors as mentioned
above as such trust models do not exist. Before discussing the issues and approaches for trust
management (TM) in e-commerce, let us look at the notion of trust.
Trust is the extent to which one party is willing to depend on somebody, or something,
in a given situation with a feeling of relative security, even though negative consequences
are possible. It is a pervasive notion and, as such, has been studied thoroughly in a variety
of different fields, including the social sciences, economics and philosophy. An important
observation from all these sources is that trust which in a sense is “one individual’s opinion of
another” is a subjective notion, and every individual decides whether to trust another based
on the evidence available for personal evaluation (although one might delegate this decision
to a more authoritative source in certain circumstances i.e. a notion of context is necessary).
Also, trust is not symmetric: two individuals do not need to have similar levels of trust in each
other. Even if two entities get the same evidence, they might not necessarily interpret this
information in the same way. It is self-preserving and self-amplifying, and increases through
periodic successful interactions, and degrades through disuse or misuse.
In terms of economic theory, trust is an instrument for carrying forward the trade. Individuals
write trade contract, which helps them as a legal document if some dispute among them
arises in future. For example, imagine a buyer, who requires a certain item (or service) from
a seller. Let us suppose that the exact nature of the contract is uncertain as the complete
nature of the item is not yet realized. In an ideal world, the parties would write a contingent
contract specifying exactly which are the deliverables in each state. However, if the number
of states is very large, such a contract would be prohibitively expensive. In such situations,
the parties will write an incomplete contract. When the state of nature is clear, they will
renegotiate the contract, since at this stage they know what kind of goods are to be traded
or each one’s responsibilities and accountabilities are clear (Hart & Moore 1999). It must be
pointed out that there can be a series of incomplete contracts before the final one is reached.
In a sense, this leads to multi-stage contracts (that are sequential in nature) or hierarchical.
In fact, success of one stage increases the trust for the next level. When the setup of trade
involves complex information and trust, contractual incompleteness arises endogenously.
In such situations, such incomplete contract is the only efficient way for the transaction to
succeed and is referred to as equilibrium contract or optimal contract. Thus, any TMM should
support at least specification of contracts that are used in practice traditionally if not more.
It is becoming increasingly important for the electronic community to have means and
methods for tackling trust related issues for e-transactions. We feel that trust in e-commerce
can be enhanced by the following factors.
(1) Social factors (invoke and establish trust): reputation, familiarity,
(2) legal system (enforce trust): law enforcement and judicial system,
(3) organizational and procedural factors (enable trust): banks and their rules, and
(4) technology (enable and enforce trust): cryptography, protocol standards, tools.
In this paper, we shall discuss technological issues involved in trust; other issues are out of
the scope of this paper. It is important to note that in the technology involved in present day
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transactions, it is indeed possible to have human intervention at all stages. In other words,
some of the technology has been accepted socially to be trustworthy. The large question is
to see how the integration of technology and human intervention enhances the trust of both.
Some of the characteristic features of any transactions are as below.
(1) Identification and authentication,
(2) message confidentiality,
(3) message integrity,
(4) non-repudiation,
(5) transparent transaction process,
(6) traceability and accountability.
Thus, in an integrated form of the e-transactions if we can provide a measure of trust (measure
may not be uniform – it is somewhat relative to those on which the community has accepted
to be trustful) on the above characteristics, it is indeed possible to trust an unfamiliar entity
over the Internet for commercial transactions.
The first four characteristics can be directly provided using public-key infrastructures (PKI)
framework like PGP (Zimmermann 1995), X.509 (Ford & Baum 2002), SPKI/SDSI (Clarke
et al 2001) that have generated trust in the society. Access control models based on PKIs,
like RBAC (Ferraiolo et al 2000), PolicyMaker (Blaze et al 1998), KeyNote (Blaze et al
1999) provide a specification language that allows users to specify the fifth characteristic
involving organizational and procedural factors. Traceability and accountability issues are
prominent when users come across unfamiliar, autonomous and mobile entities, i.e. entities
not accountable to some mutually acceptable agency1. PolicyMaker, KeyNote allow users to
write assertion-based rules for concluding traceability and accountability of communicating
partner before initiating the transaction in case of insufficient trust. However, these frameworks
use X.509 as underlying cryptographic framework and inherit X.509’s disadvantages due to
its top-down (centralized) architecture. SPKI/SDSI, a distributed PKI framework, is another
powerful candidate but does not have a specification language to capture the subjective and
non-symmetric nature of trust.
The underlying PKI framework plays an important role in the scalability of TMM. In
centralized models like X.509, trust accumulates at the global CA (root certification authority)
and trustworthiness of CAs directly matters to the trust relation between the relying entities.
TMMs based on hierarchical PKIs fall short of establishing a provable trust link between its
user and an unknown user from a totally different administrative domain having no cross-
certification path established with the hierarchy. Also, the disadvantages of PKIs like stale
information in certificates, CRLs (certificate revocation lists), certificate’s inability to capture
dynamic information, etc., become disadvantages of the TMM. TMMs based on on-line
capability model (Miller et al 2001) addresses some of these shortcomings with additional
cost. Several other TMMs have been proposed for unenforced transactions, where traceability
and accountability is less, in distributed environment. PeerTrust (Xiong & Liu 2003), Poblano
(Chen & Yeager 2003), EigenTrust (Kamvar et al 2003), Advogato (Levien & Aiken 2005),
Appleseed (Ziegler & Lausen 2004), PageRank (Page et al 1998) are some of the reputation-
based TMMs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: A comparative analysis of existing TMMs
is given in §2. Evolution of trust and other non-technological parameters involved in trust
1Note that these features exist even in traditional commerce
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formation are discussed in §3. In §4, we present our approach towards designing a generalized
form of access control framework called flexi-ACL (Patil & Shyamasundar 2003a), that has
provisions for hybrid types of access control mechanisms, which also permits specifications
of alternative or a priori anticipated emergency measures of access control for services. The
paper concludes in §5.
2. Comparative study of existing trust models
In this section, we shall provide a comparative analysis of various frameworks in practice
as TM systems. PKI frameworks have been extensively used for realizing TMMs since they
provide verifiable methods for executing contracts. We shall also see how the PKI-enabled
TMMs are more expressive to handle complex contracts.
2.1 PKIs as trust management systems
PKIs provide a systematic framework to generate, distribute, and maintain the cryptographic
key pairs required for achieving properties like authentication, authorization, data (commu-
nication) confidentiality, data integrity, non-repudiation of communications over the internet.
These frameworks use a data-structure, called digital certificate, to populate user’s crypto-
graphic key and other credentials. The methods to distribute and maintain the digital certifi-
cates may be different in each of these frameworks. This is a very useful framework for trust
establishment, enhancement and enforcement.
In this sub-section, we shall discuss three prominent PKI frameworks differentiated by
their architecture, thus providing three distinct trust models.
2.1a Pretty good privacy (PGP): PGP was mainly envisaged for secure e-mail commu-
nication. In fact, even now, for this purpose, it has generated a good amount of trust. Of
course, it has drawbacks but the trust is for class of applications or transactions. PGP is
a zero-configuration model, i.e. without any pre-configured infrastructural setup, users can
participate in it. Users of PGP generate an asymmetric key pair on their own and distribute
their public-key through floppies or newspapers (or any other off-line medium), so that
others can communicate securely with them. Users maintain public keys of other users in
a local database, called keyring. While adding a new user and corresponding public key
to the keyring, the owner of the keyring also assigns a non-negative trust value to that
entry; emphasizing its trust over that binding. It is obvious that keys exchanged person-
ally will get higher trust values, unlike the keys retrieved using the internet as an exchange
medium.
Users of PGP may retrieve public-keys of interest from keyrings of other users, which have
high trust values in the local database. Thus, users of PGP form a decentralized database of
user’s name-key bindings associated with a non-negative trust value. Users independently
update their keyrings and may share it with others. This mesh of name-key bindings formed
by closely connected users is called “Web-of-Trust”. The users of this model run the risk of
being manipulated by wrong or stale information provided by the members of “Web-of-Trust”.
Otherwise, this framework can provide verifiable means to do authentication, can support
message confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation of transactions but lacks accountability,
and cannot have transparent processes because there is no authority which can vouch for
principals when there is no or less trust between communicating peers. So, it cannot be used
in its original form for e-transactions.
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2.1b X.509: This framework has become a de facto standard for extracting cryptographic
features required for e-transactions. Initial configuration involves a certification authority
(CA), a trusted authority, accountable for issuance and revocation of digital certificates. Hav-
ing the public-key of CA, users of this framework are ensured of the ability to correctly retrieve
public-keys of others. Cross-certification among the CAs greatly increases user’s ability to
authenticate other users lying under external CAs. But the scheme also suffers from inability to
ensure the freshness of user’s public-keys and eventually the credentials associated with them.
X.509 was initially developed to authenticate users of X.500 global directory structure so
that they can update their portion of the directory structure. Later on, the framework was
extended to cater to various applications by embedding application-specific credentials into
the certificate to achieve authorization, data confidentiality, integrity, and non-repudiation
apart from authentication. Also, clubbing together all the user’s authorizations into a single
certificate, besides the name binding, is a serious privacy issue.
In X.509, authorizations can only flow from a CA to the subjects of the certificate and
thus, forms a rigid structure (hierarchical or centralized). Further, authentication among users
involves inescapable implicit trust on the intermediate CAs, which is not an acceptable norm
for e-transactions or distributed applications. But this framework provides all the features that
form the basis of trust formation.
2.1c SPKI/SDSI: This framework provides the authentication and authorization mecha-
nism in a distributed environment. Instead of a CA determining the name and authorization
binding, principals of the system are allowed to issue certificates. It is a bottom-up approach
of devising a PKI, in which small autonomous islands of trusted principals can form a scal-
able distributed PKI by issuing certificates binding to principals in other autonomous islands.
Unlike X.509, the principals can independently manage their local name spaces and can
refer to names defined in other principals’ name space. Name certificates are purely used for
binding relationship between issuer of the certificate and the subject of the certificate. The
authorization certificates deal with delegation of a particular authorization mentioned in the
certificate from its issuer to the subject or a group of subjects specified in it. While issuing
an authorization certificate the issuer also specifies whether the subject of the certificate can
further delegate the authorization or not by keeping a flag on or off. In this framework, the
onus of authentication and proof of authorization to do something is left to the user. On the
user’s part, the compilation of authorization proof is a highly distributed process in terms of
finding group memberships and appropriate missing authorization links from various princi-
pals that might help in forming a chain (sometimes more than one) of certificates implicating
the authorization proof. The user can submit one of the certificate chains (possibly the one
that reveals only the necessary information for the transaction to succeed (Patil & Shyama-
sundar 2003b) to the service provider as a proof of policy conformance. Thus, though such a
security framework gives its users much flexibility, it suffers from problems that are inherent
to all PKIs (arising due to the static nature of digital certificates).
There is nothing like the possibility of withdrawing/immediate revocation of authorization
in this framework. Therefore, authorizations are conferred to the subjects based on the trust
levels at the time of issuance and it remains statically valid until the certificate expires.
Once a principal issues an authorization certificate, it has no control over the future behavior
of the subject of that authorization. The subject might lend over its authorization to other
unauthorized entities or even further delegate (if the delegation is allowed) that authorization
without conforming to the policy or contract under which it has acquired the authorization,
breaching the trust of the issuer. Through an intelligent use of extended names, groups and
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Table 1. Comparison between PGP, X.509, and SPKI/SDSI.
PGP X.509 SPKI/SDSI
Architecture Bottom-up Top-down Bottom-up
Certificates Only name
certificates
Single certificate contains
name and authorization info
Separate name and authoriza-
tion certificates
Name space Global (email) Global Local, extendable
CA characteristics Web-of-Trust Hierarchical Each public-key can act as a
CA
Authorization
delegation
Not available Strictly from CA to subjects Arbitrarily among users,
optional k-of-n subjects
Operational
environment
Decentralized Centralized Decentralized
Suitability as a
trust model
Poor Acceptable Acceptable, more expressive
than X.509
threshold authorizations, it is possible to keep a check on the behavior of principals; however,
it becomes cumbersome in highly distributed environments and it will not be always possible
for a service administrator to write access policies or contracts ex ante, for avoiding the
unwanted scenarios. In other words, such schemes are not scalable. It may further be noted
that in a distributed system, the policies of the different administrative domains may change
dynamically and independently from other collaborating domains. So, even making thoughtful
use of the extended names, group definitions and threshold authorizations without a priori
knowledge of user’s behavior, may not necessarily help in writing ACLs or optimal contracts
purely using the SPKI/SDSI framework. Table 1 provides a comparative view of the above
discussed PKIs with respect to some of the TMM requirements.
2.2 PKI-enabled trust management systems
It is evident that TMMs purely based on PKI frameworks are good for simple setups where
contract terms are clearly defined (complete contracts). In complex setups (possibly dis-
tributed), these models fail to capture the future behavior or outcomes arising due to the
actions taken by entities involved in the setup. Researchers have tried to capture such policies
by proposing frameworks like PolicyMaker (Blaze et al 1998), KeyNote (Blaze et al 1999)
etc. An overview of these schemes is given below.
2.2a PolicyMaker: PolicyMaker is an unified approach for specifying and interpreting secu-
rity policies, credentials, and relationships that allow direct authorization of security-critical
actions. It is a language/tool in the development of services whose main goal is privacy and
authenticity. It is an attempt to solve the need to find a suitably trustworthy copy of the public-
key of someone with whom one wants to communicate. The general principles of this scheme
are:
• unified mechanism: provides a common language for policies, credentials, and relation-
ships,
• flexibility: succinctness, the framework accommodates the PGP and X.509 certificates
with trivial modifications,
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• locality of control: avoids the monolithic hierarchy of certifying authorities,
• separation of mechanism from policy: credentials-verification mechanism does not
depend on credentials themselves or the semantics of the applications that use them.
PolicyMaker’s ability to express security credentials and policies without requiring the appli-
cation to manage a mapping between personal identity and authority is especially convenient
in systems that include anonymity as a security requirement. It also provides ways to express
the conditions under which an individual or an authority is trusted and the conditions under
which trust may be deferred.
2.2b KeyNote: It is a notation for specifying local security policies and security credentials
that can be sent over an untrusted network. It is similar in spirit to the approach of PolicyMaker.
KeyNote accepts as input a set of local policy assertions, a collection of credential assertions,
and a collection of attributes (action environment) that describes a proposed trusted action
associated with a set of public-keys. Applying assertion predicates to the environment, it
decides consistency of actions with local policy.
This scheme is monotonic; adding an assertion to a query can never result in a query
having a lower compliance value that it would have had without the assertion and removing
an assertion never results in increasing the compliance value returned by KeyNote for a given
query. This property can simplify the design and analysis of complex network-based security
protocols required for e-transactions. KeyNote and PolicyMaker use X.509 as underlying
security infrastructure and are capable of writing more complex security policies than that
are possible under X.509 alone.
2.2c REFEREE: REFEREE (Chu et al 1997) provides both a general policy-evaluation
mechanism for Web clients and servers and a language for specifying trust policies. It places
all trust decisions under explicit policy control; in the REFEREE model, every action, includ-
ing evaluation of compliance with policy, happens under the control of some policy. That is,
REFEREE is a system for writing policies about policies, as well as policies about crypto-
graphic keys, PICS label bureaus, certification authorities, trust delegation, etc.
2.2d Antigone: The Antigone system (McDaniel et al 1999) is a middle-ware layer that
provides flexible interfaces for defining policy in group applications. Central to the design
of Antigone is the definition of a suite of mechanisms that provide the core secure group
services. Through the composition of the Antigone mechanisms (and their underlying micro-
protocols), an application may precisely define the group policy. The component design
achieves technology and infrastructure independence; new mechanisms may integrate desired
functionality without affecting other system services.
All these schemes are deficient in handling advanced security issues like; immediate revo-
cation of authority, tracking dynamic changes pertaining to individual entities, containing
flow of delegated authorizations etc., in distributed setups. Inability of these schemes to han-
dle such issues is due to the off-line nature of underlying PKI infrastructure and the static
nature of their basic building block; digital certificate (Patil & Shyamasundar 2004a). Ad hoc
extensions to PKI frameworks have been done to induce online validation of certificates –
OCSP (Ford & Baum 2002), but operating such a system is very costly and may not suitably
cater to all ranges of applications over the Internet.
A typical application scenario under PolicyMaker/KeyNote and other script-based frame-
works discussed above could be; access will be granted to a principal if the principal sends a
signed request using his e-mail account. The compliance checking routine will first check the
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requester’s signature on the access request made along with appropriate authorization cre-
dentials and will also verify the e-mail header field “From:” appearing in the e-mail request.
2.3 Capability-based trust management systems
Recently, capability-based access control approaches traditionally used in operating systems
have been adapted for applications in distributed environments. Access control system based
totally on capability model is an on-line system as opposed to the off-line feature of PKI
model. In this section, we shall discuss two such frameworks; E (Millet et al 2001; Miller &
Shapiro 2003) and RBAC (Ferraiolo et al 2000).
2.3a Language E: E (Millet et al 2001; Miller & Shapiro 2003) is a simple, secure, dis-
tributed, pure-object, persistent programming language. It blends lambda calculus, security
as capabilities, and modern cryptography. It provides cryptographic capabilities as an abstrac-
tion allowing economy of engineering effort in creating smart contracts. A capability is a
pairing of a designated process with a set of services that the process provides. And when dif-
ferent capabilities make different behaviours from the same process, we can view the process
as a composite and each of its capabilities as a facet. These processes can cooperate-operate
without vulnerability because all authorities are accessed only by references. Therefore, the
credential proofs are the outcome of the relationships between the processes/entities at that
particular time. This way the language E plans to tackle the complex relationships between
the entities in a distributed environment by confining the delegated authorities.
2.3b RBAC: Role-based access control (Ferraiolo et al 2000) is a framework designed for
simple management of permissions by associating them with roles, and users with appro-
priate roles. The roles can be granted new permissions as new applications and systems are
incorporated, and the permissions can be revoked from roles as need arises. This approach is
more stable because an organization’s activities or functions usually change less frequently
in contrast to the user’s membership to roles. RBAC is policy-neutral by itself. It allows to
express hierarchical structure of roles, possibly with constraints. Extensions to RBAC also
allow us to express access policies spanning across more than one administrative domain.
Though these schemes support the basic characteristics required for trust formation and
enforcement and provide mechanisms to handle complex issues like immediate revocation,
effective confinement of delegated authority, they fail to write policies for engagement with
unknown principals or electronic communities over the internet. Online schemes are generally
good for setups involving well-defined contracts (complete contracts).
Engaging unfamiliar entities into the transaction of common interest or collaboration is a
necessary requirement for doing trade over the Internet. Researchers have proposed several
schemes for such scenarios, based on reputation of unknown entities. Several applications
exist that have direct analogy with this scenario; e.g., P2P computing, mobile ad hoc networks
etc. In next section, we shall discuss reputation-based schemes in practice.
2.4 Reputation-based trust management systems
On a decentralized network (zero configuration situation - ad hoc network), like peer-to-peer
(P2P), users can see from where the information arrives, as well communicate their opinions
on both the information they have acquired, and the peers who are its source. These per-
sonal opinions can be collected, exchanged, and evaluated. Furthermore, these opinions, when
evaluated, can be used as guidelines for searching for information, and recommending infor-
mation sources, thus, creating decentralized, personalized “Web-of-Trust”. Trust becomes a
Trust management for e-transactions 149
social contract with social implications for the participants. Each user of such decentralized
setup will develop a reputation among his peers. Let us see few prominent reputation-based
TM schemes.
2.4a PeerTrust: PeerTrust (Xiong & Liu 2003) aims to develop a trust mechanism for P2P
networks so peers can quantify and compare the trustworthiness of other peers and perform
trusted interactions based on their past interaction histories without trusted third parties. This
model has two main features. First, it has three basic trust parameters and two adaptive factors
in computing trustworthiness of peers, namely, feedback a peer receives from other peers,
the total number of transactions a peer performs, the credibility of the feedback sources,
transaction context factor and the community context factor. Second, it defines a general trust
metric to combine these parameters.
2.4b Poblano: Poblano (Chen & Yeager 2003) is a JXTA-based effort to establish a repu-
tation based decentralized trust model. It provides protocols for disseminating trust and algo-
rithms required to update trust. This model is useful in performing reputation guided search
and designing a recommendation system for security purposes. It tries to emulate PGP.
2.4c EigenTrust: EigenTrust (Kamvar et al 2003) in its basic form, is intended to decrease
the number of downloads of non-authentic files in a P2P file-sharing network using a reputation
model. In this scheme, each peer is assigned a unique global trust value, based on the peer’s
history of uploads. The algorithm provided in this scheme allows a user to compute global
trust values in the distributed environment. By having peers use these global trust values
to choose the peers from whom they download, the network effectively identifies malicious
peers and isolates them from the network.
2.4d Advogato: Advogato (Levien & Aiken 0000) provides a trust metric, called Advogato
maximum flow trust metric, in order to discover which users are trusted by members of an
on-line community and which are not. Hereby, trust is computed by a centralized community
server and considered relative to a seed of users enjoying supreme trust. However, the metric
is not only applicable to community servers, but also arbitrary agents which may compute
own trusted peers and not for the whole community they belong to. In this case, the agent
itself constitutes the singleton trust seed. This model does not provide support for weighted
trust relationships.
2.4e Appleseed and PageRank: Appleseed (Ziegler & Lausen 2004) can be seen as an
improvement over Advogato model in terms of computation of local trust metric and its
propagation. It also has working similarity with Google’s PageRank (Page et al 1998) ranking
algorithm.
A typical application scenario for above mentioned reputation-based framework can be
described as follows: a principal would like to interact with a peer, for certain download, who
is serving other peers in the setup for a long time with a satisfactory quality of service and
against whom it has not heard of any complaint from the community. It may also consider its
own past experience with that peer while making a decision on current requirement. But it
may still get cheated by downloading a virus instead of an intended code. This is the risk that
the relying party is taking even though there is a perceived risk associated with the transaction.
2.4f TM systems based on rapport, introduction: Resurrecting duckling: Usually, autho-
rization mechanisms involve a centralized system administrator and that may be implemented
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as access control lists or capabilities. But, in the zero-configuration environment the central
authority will be absent and one has to establish the secure transient association between the
entities coming into the environment. This is done under this framework by imprinting. As
soon as an entity is exposed to intended environment, the entity will recognize as its owner
the first entity that sends it a secret key and will remain faithful to its owner (Stajano & Ander-
son 1999). Thus, there will be a trusted environment in which all entities are faithful to their
owner (controller). Having such trusted islands one can scale it up to larger community.
Apart from parameters like reputation etc., while engaging with unfamiliar entities over
the Internet, various other non-technological parameters are also involved whose value or
intensity of effect on individual’s decision making is subjective. In next section, we shall
discuss such parameters that have been extensively studied in other branches of science and
have strong relevance for e-transactions.
3. Role of non-technological parameters in trust formation
The concept of trust has been addressed within many disciplines, including philosophy, psy-
chology, sociology, transaction economics, and organization theory. This has resulted in a
body of research that is widely divergent and at times contradictory. It is widely acknowl-
edged that trust is complex and multidimensional. However, research often focuses narrowly
on specific aspects of trust, failing to fully capture its multidimensional nature. Following
are the important factors that variably affect an individual’s decision-making process before
transacting with an unfamiliar entity over the internet.
• References: References greatly enhance trust between the unfamiliar communicating
partners. Two potential collaborators, unfamiliar with each other, may look for a prin-
cipal commonly known to both of them. In fact, it is always possible to find a common
reference known to both collaborators, directly or indirectly. The reference is said to be
direct when only one referee who knows both collaborators first hand, otherwise it is said
to be indirect. Harvard Professor Stanley Milgram has suggested that we are separated
from every one else in this world only by six others at the most (Milgram 1967; Kleinberg
2000). However, direct references generally fetch more trust value than the indirect ref-
erence but an individual’s optimism, intention behind the collaboration also determines
the trust value. References provide some sort of guarantee/non-repudiation/traceability
when such things are not possible from underlying technological framework.
• Optimism, intentions and risk: Optimism is the positive expectation a principal has for
another principal or an organization based on past performance and truthful guarantees.
Trust is about expectations of the future. Also, a principal’s intentions behind collab-
oration plays an important role in the formation of a successful collaboration. But the
extent to which a principal can be optimistic is capped by the risk associated with the
unsuccessful or undesired outcome of the transaction. Principals go ahead with transac-
tions with unfamiliar entities even though they are aware of perceived risk, it is because
of either their intentions behind the transaction or their belief in evidences associated
with the transaction or both of these.
• Belief and transitivity of trust: Harbison and Christianson, in their position paper (Chris-
tianson & Harbison 1997) state that trust is an epistemic notion: statements about trust
are statements about certain beliefs held by others and their reasons for holding them,
not about what would make such beliefs true in the real world. The derivation of com-
fortable trust value for a communicating partner involves one’s belief in the available
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set of associated evidences, willingness to take risk, intentions, and his own set of con-
textual parameters. We should not expect users to behave monotonously on these basic
parameters in trust formation. Therefore, a generic trust management framework should
provide means and methods for the users to express their beliefs (possibly conditional)
while avoiding unintentional transitivity of trust (Christianson & Harbison 1997). It is
difficult to achieve a natural TMM by providing a monotonous rule set, as is the case in
most of the existing frameworks used as TMMs.
Trust increases through periodic successful interactions, and it degrades through disuse or
misuse. Based on the severity of perceived risk associated with applications, users enter into
collaboration with one of the four distinguishable regions of following figure 1 as the initial
trust value. For example, in transactions of high financial value, users might not trust the
communicating peer easily and may initiate the negotiation with the potential collaborator by
picking a value in first quadrant (near zero trust value). The trust between the collaborators
may gradually increase after enough number of successful transactions and in future they
might collaborate for transactions of higher value. Micro-payment schemes like e-coupons
(Patil & Shyamasundar 2004b) allow users to specify the financial worth of the fundamental
monetary unit, are necessary to implement TMMs. These features provide some capability to
limit the risk involved in transacting with strangers and can aid in evolving towards macro-
payment mode (by increasing the intrinsic value of fundamental monetary unit or efficiently
paying more units) after gathering/building enough trust with the peer. We observed similar
risk-management feature in the vendors of our micro-payment system e-coupons, where
vendors take a risk of accepting already spent payment-values from users. Since the protocol
is an off-line protocol, for the sake of efficiency and cost, vendors do not verify payments
made by users at the very beginning of their engagement. Vendor may come to know about
the attempts of double-spending only after it sends the collected payment information to
bank. Upon finding the effort of double-spending, vendor will stop trading with such user.
In fact, there are several micro-transaction systems that just work on randomized billing that
works out to be okay on an average, assuming a certain scenario of usage (in a sense, various
Figure 1. Evolution of trust (conceptual-
ized by Paul English and Robert Fischer).
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schemes for cell phone services also follow such schemes). In these scenarios the trust comes
from the following aspects.
(1) The transaction value is low,
(2) the average billing meets the expectation of the user,
(3) double spending is not frequent, and
(4) the user can withdraw when he finds conditions (2)–(3) are not satisfied.
On the contrary, in applications like e-mails, principals let anyone send them mails, then start
blocking the senders (spammers) who have breached the trust. In these situations, the principal
offers the transactions with trust (assumes that parties do not send e-mails unnecessarily in a
continuous way) and blacklists those who violate the accepted trust or the protocol.
The above scenarios indicate the complexity of trust even in such simple domains. Our
study shows that none of the existing TMMs provide means and methods to write policies
that takes into account all the factors in trust formation, enhancement and enforcement. Most
of the TMMs are efficient when the setup is simple and small (scalability is a real issue). They
work fine for complete contracts, but fail to handle optimal contracts or the complexity when
the contracts are incomplete.
Economists show that an optimal response to complex information in agency relationships
is for the contracting parties to choose exceedingly simple contracts – a fixed wage plus a dis-
cretionary bonus, for instance (Al-Najjar & Casadesus-Masanell 2001; Hart & Moore 1999).
In the virtual world, we have technological means for enforcing simple complete contracts –
fixed wage, but we do not have a comprehensive framework that fairly captures the incom-
pleteness in contract induces by – discretionary bonus. flexi-ACL is an effort in this direction.
This framework provides means and methods for its users to define the acceptable boundary
conditions over collaborating peer’s behavior while entering into incomplete contracts. Thus,
allowing each individual entity of the system to clearly express the acceptable conditions
under which it wants to collaborate with any other peer (possibly unknown). In the next sec-
tion, we shall discuss the features captured in the flexi-ACL framework to execute complex,
incomplete contracts.
A flexible and manageable trust management framework which can scale across the inter-
organizational autonomous administrative domains, remains a key issue. Also the business
topology demands an environment which is distributed and supporting methods to seamlessly
interact between the distributed entities. Let us briefly enumerate the desired properties of a
generic TMM.
(1) It should efficiently perform policy compliance check, against locally defined policy, over
a set of credentials provided along with request and decide whether compliance with the
local policy has been proven, and may also provide reasons for non-compliance along
with additional information about how to proceed,
(2) should have provisions for envisaging risk management strategy, fault-tolerance under
policy specification language,
(3) it should allow each entity to maintain his own local, statistical view of the whole trust
network,
(4) should be scalable and manageable,
(5) should be expressive enough to granularly address policies affecting individual entity
(since for the sake of manage-ability, one introduces abstraction of class of entities falling
under a common security or trust policy),
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(6) should be flexible enough to express policies spanning across different administrative
domains,
(7) should allow users to import trust values computed by other trusted entities for unknown
entities (i.e., specifying deferred policies based on policies defined elsewhere – extended
policy specification),
(8) should be sound; A TMM is said to be sound, under which existing trust relationships
can only be “qualified” and “combined” to form trust relationships with new characteris-
tics.
By design, TMM unifies the notions of security policy, credentials, access control, and autho-
rization. A generic TMM should support a variety of methods to an user to express his trust
policy based on his belief, intentions, willingness to take risk and the context. The designer’s
goal is to engage users quickly, establish and preserve strategic trust under challenging situa-
tions. Requirements concerning security, reliability, and availability must be made by trading
off costs and benefits and identifying acceptable levels of risk.
4. flexi-ACL
flexi-ACL (Patil & Shyamasundar 2003a; Patil & Shyamasundar 2004a) is an expressive
access control policy specification framework in which, SPKI/SDSI is used as the underly-
ing security infrastructure. This framework integrates a priori defined authentication mech-
anisms (on-line/off-line) with the underlying security infrastructure to perform complex and
dynamic access policy conformance checks over incoming access requests. This framework
is capable of serving advanced properties like immediate revocation of authorization (con-
tract), confinement of delegated authorization, provisions for alternate authorization policy as
an emergency measure etc. (Patil & Shyamasundar 2004a) apart from the basic characteris-
tics like non-repudiation, confidentiality, traceability and accountability, required for on-line
transactions in a secure and trusted manner. Therefore, flexi-ACL can be used as a powerful
replacement for other traditional access control mechanisms (like pure PKIs as TMMs) as an
underlying mechanism for constructing TMMs. The relation or hierarchy between different
frameworks involved in the construction of a TMM is shown below in figure 2.
Figure 2. Hierarchy of frameworks in construction of a TMM.
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Figure 3. flexi-ACL: Typical structure.
Readers are encouraged to refer (Patil & Shyamasundar 2003a; Patil & Shyamasundar
2004a) for complete understanding of flexi-ACL functionality, syntax and semantics. flexi-
ACL segregates access control policy into global and local policy. By doing so, it empowers the
resource controller (service provider) to implement properties like immediate authorization
revocation of non-conforming users, fine-grained access to users, users’ rights amplification
etc., and brings modularity and manageability to the setup (Patil & Shyamasundar 2004a).
The approach of segregating the more general access control policies, called global policy,
from the local policies that are subjected to change more frequently or dynamically, helps
us in realizing execution of incomplete contracts. The global policies are generally imbibed
into the digital certificates since they are not subjected to frequent modifications and can be
enforced or verified in an off-line and provable fashion. Whereas the local policies that are
subjected to change based on context are maintained at the resource controller’s side (Patil
& Shyamasundar 2004a). Local policies are responsible for fairly enforcing the incomplete
terms implicated into the contract (overall policy).
Figure 3 shows a typical access control policy designed using heterogeneous e-
authentication mechanisms (like spki, pamd, RSA SecurID, biometric,
TCP/IP wrapper, token etc.,) as basic access control rules2. The heterogeneous
authentication mechanisms are glued together using the boolean AND, OR operators.
The heterogeneous primitive access control rules can be aggregated into an
acl-block. Such blocks can be placed under another construct called quorum to achieve
a very flexible access control policy expression. Such an unique, modular method of express-
ing access control policies allow a resource administrator to establish a comfortable trust or
credibility level before making access control decisions. For the policy specified in figure 3,
the requester has to conform to any of the two acl-blocks to get resource access, since
the quorum is set to 1.
Let us analyse the sample flexi-ACL policy shown in figure 3, by assigning suitable types
to the (rule) structures. For the sake of simplicity, we shall use only spki, TCP/IP
wrapper, and token types for the analysis.
• acl-block B1 :=
– (rule X1) :=
(type := spki)
(spki := my-collaborators (delegate)
(tag (ftp://tifr.res.in (read write))))
Principals who can provide a certificate chain proving their membership to the
group my-collaborators will evaluate this rule to TRUE or 1. Contracts of
2The complete details of flexi-ACL specifications are available in (Patil & Shyamasundar 2003a)
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Table 2. AND, OR operators.
Expression Description
(rule X1) AND (rule X2) returns 1; when evaluate (rule X1) = 1 and evaluate
(rule X2) = 1, else returns 0
(rule Y3) OR (rule Y4) returns 0; when evaluate (rule Y3) = 0 and evaluate
(rule Y4) = 0, else returns 1
this nature are used to distinguish potential collaborators on the basis of possession
of credentials.
– (rule X2) :=
(type := TCP/IP wrapper)
(TCP/IP wrapper := 158·144·0·0/16)
To successfully evaluate this rule, principals should be making access request from
an IP address belonging to the range specified in this rule. These rules are used to
gather evidence about potential collaborators.
– (rule X3) :=
(type := token)
(token := (issuer (some-notary.com)) (policy XYZ))
To successfully evaluate this rule, principals should produce a cryptographictoken
issued by a principal trusted by the service provider. Service provider may specify a
more trusted issuer for transactions of high risk. These kinds of rules are helpful
while engaging unfamiliar collaborators based on the references they are able to
provide. The unfamiliar entity’s ability to obtain a token from the specified issuer
is determined by his capability to satisfy policies defined at the token issuer’s end
(which can be of type flexi-ACL again!)
As we can see from figure 3 that the quorum is set to 1, a potential collaborator has
to satisfy any of the acl-blocks, i.e. either acl-block B1 or acl-block B2.
Furthermore, to satisfy the sub-policy specified in acl-block B1, one must evaluate
the expression to {TRUE} (i.e. the return value should be equal to (1)) since the set
of rules in this block are chained together by AND operator (see table 2). The rule,
(rule X1), is of type spki, based on SPKI/SDSI security infrastructure, and is
helpful in enforcing complete contracts, for which the terms are dictated inside the static
digital certificates. The auxiliary terms of incomplete contracts are achieved through
(rule X2) and (rule X3), based on the evidence associated with the transaction
and successful vouchers made for the potential collaborator by the notary respectively.
• acl-block B2 :=
– (rule X1) := (type := spki)
(spki := my-collaborators (delegate)
(tag (ftp://tifr.res.in (read write))))
– (rule Y1) :=
(type := TCP/IP wrapper)
(TCP/IP wrapper := 158·144·64·0/26)
In this rule, a shorter range of IP address from which principals should originate
their access request is specified. In this fashion, service provider is demanding a
more stricter or stronger evidence from the potential collaborators.
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– (rule Y2) :=
(type := token)
(token := (issuer (notary.gov)) (policy XYZ))
In this rule, the service provider has specified a highly trusted notary from whom
it is willing to accept token.
acl-block B2 can be successfully evaluated if principals can successfully evaluate
its constituent, i.e. (rule X1) – as described above and either of (rule Y1) or
(rule Y2). These rules are similar to (rule X2) and (rule X3) respectively,
except that a strong evidence and a strong reference is demanded from the potential
collaborators.
Therefore, any principal who is capable of generating a spki type of proof showing
its membership to the group my-collaborators defined by the owner of ftp-server
ftp://tifr.res.in can access/modify the digital content stored on the server, provided
that it is used for research purpose and no commercial gain is made out of it. We broke this
incomplete contract into static part (i.e. prove your membership) and auxiliary part (i.e. you
are using the service for research purpose). IP range of 158·144·0·0/16 is substantially
allotted to .res.in organizations (research organizations), so the access requests should origi-
nate from these IP addresses. However, acl-block B2 provides some relaxation on this
requirement, a token from a trusted server will suffice for obtaining comfortable trust value
to go ahead with the transaction. In this fashion, flexi-ACL provides means and methods for
users to express the trust relationships in a manageable and natural way.
From the above highlights, the reader can see that flexi-ACL supports specification of
hierarchical or multi-stage contracts that require the notion of state. Further details can be
obtained from the papers referred to.
Integration of a TMM with an application shall run from initial phase of finding trustwor-
thiness of the peer (at the same stage where a PKI-based framework provides authentication
for known peers) till the completion of the transaction by recording the transaction experience
for future use.
5. Conclusions
Trust in information services and technologies has become an increasingly important issue
for today’s ever-changing networked world. The development of trust among business, con-
sumers, and other stake-holders is seen as crucial to the expansion of e-business and the full
exploitation of technological developments in this area. However, the way in which trust may
be gained in this context is not yet well understood. There is therefore a need for a com-
mon framework or language that will support a shared understanding of the concept of trust
and permits the crafting of requirements of different stake-holders based on which trust gets
developed across participating agents.
There is an urgent need of developing scalable TMMs for general acceptance of transactions
ranging from micro-to-macro values over the Internet. There may be various levels of trust
associated with the transaction; based on the value of transaction, which may depend on factors
like - risk involved, information revealed during the process (privacy and confidentiality) etc.
Further, TMMs should not overburden the user as that is counter to acceptability of trade. To
reemphasize, it is imperative that the models be scalable as the volume of transactions over
the Internet are invariably large.
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Through flexi-ACL we have attempted to provide a flexible heterogeneous framework of
TMM from which one could derive a TM system based upon the level of trust one demands. As
highlighted already, flexi-ACL, supports hierarchical setups. Thus, it enables the specification
of various contracts as discussed earlier. Implementation and performance analysis related to
applications are in progress.
In general, trust has its own risks even in traditional commerce. For instance, a credit card
user knows the risk in its usage; knowing the liability he will decide the places he will use. In
the same way, it is very important to develop risk analysis techniques for TMMs that integrate
various technological and non-technological parameters.
Search for a generic AC-cum-TMM for variety of applications in the field of security and
distributed computing (e.g. IPSec, P2P, MANET, mobile agents, distributed file-systems,
Grid etc., to name a few) is a very rich area for research. The urgency is very striking while
deploying large applications with automated agents taking decisions on behalf of their own-
ers. Programming such automation requires a framework on which applications can be built
having capability to interact, negotiate and exchange credentials to reach an optimal contract
agreeable to all involved parties. flexi-ACL is a step towards the larger goal of autonomic
computing.
The work was done under a project supported by Department of Information Technology,
Government of India. The authors thank the anonymous referees for useful suggestions. It is
a pleasure to thank the editors of this special issue for their patience and support.
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